Abstract for Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics
This paper takes up the political theory sketched by the Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum of August 1, 2002. That memorandum proposed a theory of executive
emergency powers, including the power to use torturous interrogation techniques
otherwise barred by domestic and international law. According to the memorandum,
both the power to deploy torture and other forms of coercive interrogation, and the
general freedom of the executive to direct policy in times of war, are grounded in a
justification of necessity. The central aim of my paper is to explore the force and limits
of necessity claims in moral and political theory.
I argue that we must distinguish two concepts of rights, one that designates the
protections and goals around which political institutions are built, and another that
operates within political institutions, and is subject to welfarist overrides. Instances of
the former are core human rights protections; instances of the latter are rights over
property. We must also distinguish between two concepts of necessity, as factand as
justification. When necessity is deployed as a forward-looking justification, it vitiates the
content of the principles it claims to override, and lends itself to the psychological and
institutional abuses. Understanding necessity as fact, by contrast, demands that we resist
the impulse towards justifying and institutionalizing the exception, while acknowledging
the limits of our principles.
I also pursue in this paper the parallels between the Administration’s claims of
emergency power and exceptional justification, and the political theory of German
constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt. As with Schmitt’s theory, the administration’s
theory gains executive effectiveness at the cost of rejecting two of the deepest legacies of
the Enlightenment: the inviolability of the individual and the priority of right to power.

Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics
Christopher Kutz1
“[I]f there is something worse than accepting slavery, it consists in defending it.”2
–Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity

I. Introduction: The costs of rights
Rights have costs: that is their point. The cost of rights is in the coin of foregone
welfare gains. No one minds a rights claim when honoring the right simultaneously
enhances welfare. The distinctively modern achievement for speech and conscience has
been to demonstrate the consilience of rights protecting those domains with the
promotion of a flourishing public and private life. As a result, claims of rights to free
speech and conscience are among the most easily accepted in public life. The test of a
claim of right, however, comes not when its exercise serves the public good, directly or
indirectly, but when it represents a direct hit to welfare. At the level of institutional and
philosophical discourse, we in the United States used to honor the right against torture in
this way. We saw it as justified independently of the costs or gains that might accrue
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from respecting it.3 Now things are different: the Bush administration has decided not to
pay those costs, and instead to make use of coercive, even torturous interrogation.4 The
override of detainee rights against torture has been justified on grounds of “necessity,”
i.e, that the general welfare cost of observing the right would be intolerable.
Legitimacy also has costs. Legitimacy, as normatively understood, refers to the
conditions under which exercises of institutional power can be justified. If the form of
justification were merely welfarist considerations, then the concept of legitimacy would
lack any bite: any sufficiently effective and benevolent despot could claim political
legitimacy whenever his choices served the common good. While some rulers have
claimed legitimacy on this basis, our contemporary concept of legitimacy is constrained,
at the least, by demands for actual, direct or indirect popular participation in and support
of political decisionmaking, as well as respect for basic rights. As with free speech
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rights, roughly democratic conceptions of legitimacy brook little dissent in general,
because they are highly consilient with overall welfare, as instruments for both revealing
preferences and constraining authoritarian abuses of power.
Nonetheless, the fact that decisionmaking is constrained by non-welfarist criteria
means that some choices that arguably promote welfare must be foregone. Given clear
domestic legislation5 and jus cogens international law norms that remove torture and
other forms of inhumane treatment from the plate of policy options, whatever the welfare
gains, legitimacy stands between the desire of a political actor to employ torture and its
permissibility. The effort by Bush administration lawyers to argue against the
constraining force of this legislation, and bypolicymakers to argue for preserving the
CIA’s ability to deploy torture overseas,6 represents a deliberate unwillingness to pay the
costs of legitimacy. Instead, the administration has put forward an even broader theory of
necessity: when the country is at war, the executive must be unconstrained by law in
order to serve the demands of military necessity and national security.
My aim in this Essay is to take up the question of torture’s justification at both of
the levels raised by the infamous (and now withdrawn) OLC memorandum of August 1,
2002,7 which argued that those acting under presidential authority could be considered
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unconstrained by international and domestic limits of interrogation. Although this Essay
is critical of the positions put forward in that memorandum, criticism
is not my main
point. It is easy to condemn the administration’s policy on interrogation, for general
wisdom suggests that torture is as ineffective practically as it is disturbing morally. My
aim, instead, is more analytical in two respects.
First, I argue that attention to the concept of necessity as a justification for torture,
and especially to the limits of that justification, reveals something deep about the nature
of rights as we deploy them institutionally. In particular, I argue, we make use of two
very different concepts of right, one concept that serves to impose limits on institutional,
welfarist considerations, and another that is far more sensitive to such considerations.
Instances of the former are core human rights protections; instances of the latter are rights
of disposition over property. We must also distinguish between two concepts of
necessity, as factand as justification. The confusion displayed in legal and philosophical
thought concerning torture in extremis is a consequence of the failure to grasp these
distinctions.
Second, I argue that the Bush administration’s theory of executive power displays
striking parallels to the political theory of Carl Schmitt, the conservative German
constitutional thinker, who developed an argument about the need for extra-constitutional
executive power in times of existential crisis for the Republic. Schmitt was
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uncompromising in his rejection of the modern, post-Hobbesian ideal of the lawgoverned state, whose fallacy he saw as revealed in times of national emergency. By
comparing the Administration’s subordination of ordinary law to emergency, I mean to
show how deeply radical their theory of political legitimacy is, and how subversive it is
in undermining a basic precept of liberal political thought and institutional design: that
there must be no source of unlimited political authority. As with Schmitt’s theory, the
Administration’s theory gains (potential) executive effectiveness at the cost of grave
dangers of abuse and error. But I also want to argue that both the justification offered by
the Administration for using torture in specific cases and the justification offered for
broad executive authoritycommonly misconstrue the force of claims of necessity in these
instances. Necessity cannot serve, I argue, as a justification for overriding rights against
torture or congressional authority to dictate constraints on warfare. Taking these points
together, the Administration’s policy can be seen as rejecting two of the deepest legacies
of the Enlightenment: the inviolability of the individual and the priority of right to power.
My plan is as follows. Part II sets out the Administration’s justification of torture
under claims of necessity and situates these within positive law. Part III, the heart of the
paper, takes up the claim of necessity in ethics, first in relation to the infamous “ticking
bomb” example so often put forward to establish a principle of permissibility. The
ticking bomb case is a particular example of a general problem for deontological (nonwelfarist) ethics, namely making sense of thresholds to rights claims without giving up
the core of deontological theory. I distinguish here between two different, familiar and
ubiquitous conceptions of rights, rights inherently sensitive to necessity claims, and those
insensitive, of which, I argue rights against torture are the leading case. Part IV then
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argues that the proper response to catastrophic claims for the latter sort of rights involves
distinguishing two forms of necessity, necessity as justification and necessity as fact.
Part V provides a synopsis of Schmitt’s existential model of political authority and
develops the parallel to the administration’s theory of executive power, arguing that both
suffer from a similar, devastating weakness: both permit the prospect of necessity to
defeat the claim of constitutional limits. Questions of executive power in times of
national necessity, like questions of necessity at the individual level, must recognize the
force of the two different forms of right. Part VI concludes with observations about the
role of necessity in political thought.

II. Micro- and macro-necessity
As the story is now familiar, I will summarize: the leak of government
memoranda creating a legal basis for US personnel to use torture in interrogations was a
shock to many outside the administration. The shock laylessin the acknowledgment that
the US was deploying torture than in the lawyerly justification of a practice whose
gradual eradication is one of the defining features of post-Enlightenment liberal politics.
The administration had made clear in the days immediately following the September 11th
attacks that, in Dick Cheney’s words “we have to work, though, sort of the dark side.” 8
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With a political go-ahead, the CIA decided to use a number of formerly proscribed
interrogation techniques on “high value” interrogees, notably including “water-boarding,”
or the repeated submersion in cold water to create the impression of drowning.9 At some
point, before or after the interrogations had actually begun, the CIA apparently became
worried that its personnel might be subject to the harsh penalties dictated by 18 U.S.C.
§§2340-2340A, the implementing legislation for the Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, which the U.S. signed in 1988 and
ratified in 1994.10
Prompted by the CIA’s request, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), under the
signature of Jay Bybee, provided a memorandum to the White House on August 2, 2002.
This memorandum, which I will call the Bybee memo, made a number of arguments
aimed, first, at reducing the scope of §2340 to include only the most heinous forms of
torture; second, the memo sought to establish as a principle of constitutional law that the
statute could not bind the President in exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief;
and third, the Bybee memo aimed to eliminate the force of the statute against torture
altogether, by proposing a number of criminal defenses U.S. personnel could deploy if
charged under the statute.11
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I am concerned here with the second and third points of argument in the
memorandum, which I take up in reverse order. After giving its restrictive definition of
torture, the memo contemplates the possibility that US personnel might nonetheless be
found to have engaged in acts within the scope of the statutory prohibition, namely to
have inflicted with specific intent or attempted to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering. It then considers some common-law defenses, nominally recognized by
federal law, to the crime: necessity, also called “choice of evils”; and self- or otherdefense. According to the memo, which follows Model Penal Code and hornbook law in
this regard, both defenses revolve around a claim of necessity. Under the M.P.C.
definition and at common law, necessity fully justifies a defendant in violating a penal
norm when he reasonably believes that conduct violating the norm is necessary to avoid a
“harm or evil” that is “greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged,” but only so long as there is no specific legislation or “legislative
purpose” to exclude the justification.12
Necessity is an open-ended defense, which in principle justifies otherwise
criminal acts against objects other than those directly posing the threat to the interests the
actor seeks to defend. In its paradigm instances, for example, it justifies sailors
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jettisoning cargo to save their ship or a hiker breaking into a cabin to escape a sudden
storm.13 Necessity is, therefore, the natural candidate for the situation under
consideration in the memo: the decision whether to torture an already subdued, and
therefore immediately harmless, detainee, who may have information that may help avert
a threat that may arise. In the context at issue, the claim would be used to justify an act
of interrogatory torture believed to be the unique effective means of avoiding yet worse
harms. Oddly, however, the Bybee memo also proposes that a claim of defense of others
might also excuse in the circumstances – oddly, because claims of self- and other-defense
only apply to instances of force directed at a person who himself poses the immediate
threat.14 Evidently, the memo discusses this non-applicable defense for two reasons:
first, because the caselaw of self-defense provides authority, while the caselaw of
necessity does not, for the use of violence against others; and second, because self- and
other-defense claims can properly be seen as a specific case of the broader necessity
defense. In general, as the memo correctly states, self- or other-defense justifies the use
of lethal force against someone posing a direct and imminent threat of serious bodily
harm to oneself or another, when the defender reasonably believes that such force is
“immediately necessary” to avoid the harm.15
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But self- and other-defense claims are inapplicable in cases of torturing a detainee
who does not pose a direct threat. So the argument for the justifiability of torture must
stand or fall with the force of the general necessity defense and its limitations. Let us
return, then, to the general justificatory element of necessity, specifically, the “necessity”
of deploying force in order to deflect or defeat a more serious harm. In principle, this
would seem to limit the defense to cases in which the use of force is the only possible
response to the threat and is sure to be an effective response to the threat. (It cannot be
“necessary” to respond to a threat by doing something ineffective, even if ineffective
responses are all that remain.)
In fact, the necessity defense presents much softer constraints than true necessity
would indicate, in large part because it is applied partly subjectively, relative to the
actor’s beliefs about the threat and its alternatives. An actor can mount the defense so
long as he reasonably believes in the necessity of his acts, both as to the lack of options
and as to the relative social values of the choice, but even if in fact there is no threat, or
the means he chooses is not effective. But let us put aside this qualification as well, for
the subjective justification clearly gets its normative force from an objective, ideal
situation, in which the defendant’s act really is a necessary response to a real threat.16
Only if force could be justified in fact can an actor’s judgment about when it is justified
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be itself justificatory; otherwise necessity would instead be an excuse for an error in
judgment.
What actually weakens the necessity constraint is a different epistemological
point, one relative to the time frame of the defense rather than the perceptions of the
defendant: the defense must apply to conduct undertaken before the threat materializes.
It is frequently impossible to know whether the threat really would have been realized –
perhaps the attacker would have run rather than shooting, or a rescue ship would have
appeared on the horizon. And it is almost always impossible for anyone, let alone the
defendant, to know in advance whether the use of force will be effective in meeting the
threat. The result is that the defense must be read to justify not just in (unknowable)
cases of actual necessity, but in cases where the probabilities of materialization of the
threat, non-existence of options other than force and effectiveness of the force option
must all be very high, approaching certainty at least with respect to the existence of the
threat. Rephrased positively, the defense properly says that extralegal acts are justifiable
when and only when they are highly likely to avert a virtually certain threat and it is also
highly likely that there are no other options.17 This definition lacks the term of necessity,
but it is, I suggest, the only possible form the necessity defense can take, given the
impossibility of discerning counterfactual futures. In sum, it is a slightly restrictive form
of consequentialist, cost-benefit analysis, which justifies criminal acts when, given only
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two options, good consequences outweigh the bad.18
The memo’s assertion of a criminal law defense of necessity to charges of torture
is remarkable, though not unprecedented, as the Israeli Supreme Court has also famously
mooted the possible application of the defense.19 But this form of the defense applies
only at the retail, act-specific level. The Bybee memo does something equally
remarkable but this time without precedent when it raises the claim of necessity at the
wholesale level, in its argument that domestic legislation (and a fortiori customary
international law) cannot constrain the executive from responding to the exigencies of
war by authorizing whatever policies he deems necessary under the circumstances.
Thus, in addition to the micro-necessity claim of the criminal law defense, the Bybee
memo also invokes a macro-necessity claim in its constitutional argument. According to
the memo,
[T]he Department of Justice could not enforce Section 2340A against federal
officials acting pursuant to the President’s constitutional authority to wage a
military campaign. . . . Within the limits that the Constitution itself imposes, the
scope and distribution of the powers to protect national security must be construed
to authorize the most efficacious defense of the nation and its interests in
accordance “with the realistic purposes of the entire instrument. [internal citations
omitted].20
The memo’s argument is that “intelligence operations, such as the detention and
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interrogation of enemy combatants and leaders, are both necessary and proper for the
effective conduct of a military campaign” and that the waging of such campaigns is
exclusively given to the executive by the Constitution.21 In other words, the President
can authorize his agents to use any ordinarily extra-legal means when he judges such
means appropriate (the real sense of “necessary and proper”) to meet a military objective
he has set.
On its face, this is an extraordinarily generous standard, which does not even
require a state of war, but only the context of a “national security” concern. The position
can be read as a broad form of necessity justification. While the Bybee memo authors
put forward the justification for this position as a matter of constitutional text, structure,
and original understanding, its underlying normative logic is recognizably that of
necessity as well. The governmental structure under the Constitution is itself conceived
functionally, an instrument for preserving the “security of the nation,” and the president’s
role within that scheme is defined derivatively, as necessary to effect the goal of security.
Thus, extra-legal policies are justified immediately as exercises of instrumentally
justified discretion, and ultimately therefore themselves by reference to the national
security they promote.
As an interpretation of common law, the Bybee memo has come in for severe
attack. According to many critics, its legal reasoning ranges from the ludicrous to the
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unconvincing.22 As David Luban elaborates, the memo bizarrely derives its definition of
torture from a health statute. It fails to acknowledge the total lack of caselaw behind its
assertion that the necessity defense might apply to acts of violence under color of law (as
well as the fact that the necessity defense is only recognized in federal criminal law to be
rejected in each instant case).23 In order to avoid the central limitation thatnecessity
defenses not contravene legislative purpose, the Bybee memo interprets the categorical
prohibition by §2340 of acts of torture as, by negative implication, not precluding the
defense of necessity.24 And finally, as I mentioned above, it wrenches self- or otherdefense claims from their standard setting to justify force used against a non-threatening,
but possibly useful, third-party.25
As for the constitutional argument for exclusive executive authority, the Bybee
memo fails to cite the principal caselaw on executive restraint in time of war26 or mention
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the contrary constitutional text lodging in Congress the power to “make Rules regulating
the land and naval forces” and to “discipline” the militias.27 In its excursion into original
intent, it further relies on extremely exiguous material. The memo quotes Alexander
Hamilton, in Federalist 23, on the need for broad national power to “provide for the
defence and protection of the community,” as though this implied something about the
specific authority of the President in relation to Congress.28 And even if original intent
were controlling, it is highly implausible that the Framers, students of Montesquieu and
of the English debates on the limits of royal power, would have endorsed so sweeping a
view of the executive’s authority. As Jack Rakove, one of the leading historians of the
Founding era, has said, “On balance there is little evidence that the ratifiers expected
either that the president would have the dominant voice in the making of foreign policy
or that the Senate would be reduced to acting as a mere check on the executive.”29
Indeed, given the genuinely high reputations of the OLC lawyers, the poor quality
of legal argument, and the number of lawyerly and policy hands it passed through, it is
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Rakove’s more extended discussion of the original conceptions of presidential power in
Chapter IX of his ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996). While the Framers did change a draft
version of Congress’ authority to “conduct” war to its authority to “declare” war, this is
fully consistent with a conception of executive authority to conduct war subject to
Congressional regulation. Art. 1, §8, cl. 11; ORIGINAL MEANINGS 263.

AND THE CONSTITUTION
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hard to escape the conclusion that the positions put forward in the Bybee memo are
meant primarily as arguments not of law but of policy, giving a preferred normative view
of how resorting to torture might be conceived and justified as an ethical and political
matter. After the memowas leaked, and in the face of the confirmation hearings of
Alberto Gonzales, OLC withdrew the memo as a matter of authoritative legal statement
and then specifically repudiated its arguments as to the scope of “torture.”30 The
repudiating memo, under the signature of Daniel Levin, displays far higher standards of
legal reasoning. But it does not mention the Bybee memo’s attempt to find criminal
defenses for a torture charge; and it explicitly declined to repudiate the Bybee memo’s
claim that legislation could not constrain the President from acting on military necessity
during times of war.31
The Levin memo’s stated basis for declining to address the claims of executive
authority was itselfpeculiar: the President’s “unequivocal directive” that US military
personnel not engage in torture or other forms of inhumane treatment.32 In other words,
because of an exercise of executive discretion, ostensibly, the limits on executive power
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need not be addressed. Perhaps the Levin memo was intended, in light of the President’s
directive, to clarify the scope of torture so thatU.S. personnel would know what forms of
unauthorized conduct receive the most serious punishments.33 But surely the Levin
memo should also have examined the Bybee memo’s argument for untrammeled
executive authority. Between the issuance of the Bybee menu and the superseding Levin
memo, OLC apparently took non-public action to ensure that US interrogation did not
henceforth rely on the controversial executive power analysis (with the evident
implication that the analysis had been relied on to justify practices in the interim).34 But
the reasoning behind the memo has still not been repudiated, at least to anyone’s
knowledge outside the government. And given the Administration’s efforts to expand
executive power generally and to maintain as much room as possible for methods of
interrogation that otherwise would violate ordinary assault law, at the least, I think we
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Actually, there appears to be a darker reason for the Levin memo, evidenced by the
Administration’s current efforts to exempt the CIA from pending legislation that would
prohibit any US personnel, not just military, from engaging in inhumane conduct as well
as torture. Since CIA personnel frequently operate side-by-side with military personnel,
the effect of the new definition would be to protect a space for the CIA, and hence US
overseas operations generally, to engage in cruel and inhumane treatment not rising to the
level of torture. In any event, the Levin memo leaves unanswered the key question
whether OLC still considers the most extreme practices apparently deployed by the CIA
– waterboarding and false burial – outside the scope of “torture.” For invaluable
discussion, see the blog posts of Marty Lederman at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part.html.
34

See Letter from Daniel Levin to William Haynes, II, General Counsel at the
Department of Defense, February 4, 2005, available at
<balkin.blogspot.com/Levin.Haynes.205.pdf>. The Levin letter refers to a decision
announced in December 2003 by OLC to withdraw a still-unreleased memo by John Yoo
of March 14, 2003, which apparently incorporated the executive power arguments of the
Bybee memo. For discussion, see Lederman’s commentary,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/07/graham-hearing-on-detainees-progress.html.
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may treat the theory as still very much in force and reflecting a broad political theory
about the need for decisive executive power, if not law.35
In short, the Bush administration has put before us two distinct propositions about
the justifiability of torture and has supported those propositions as a matter of normative,
instrumental argument, even as it has backed away from its legal claims. Those
propositions are:
(i) Micro-necessity: a governmental actor may use torture in interrogation at least
when torture is the only available and a highly likely means of avoiding a near
certain threat of harm graver than that incurred by the act of torture.
(ii) Macro-necessity: the President, pursuing national security or other military
objectives, may authorize torture as, at least, a necessary response to a threat to
national security.
I turn now to considering these propositions as matters of ethical and political theory.

III. Necessity, thresholds and ticking bombs
As I remarked at the beginning of this paper, the core philosophical notion of a
right is that rights provide us with reasons to act (or not act) even when aggregative
welfarist considerations point the other way.36 To put the point differently, there are
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Dana Priest and Robin Wright, Cheney Fights for Detainee Policy, WASH. POST, Nov.
7, 2005 (“Cheney’s campbelieves the president needs nearly unfettered power to deal
with terrorists to protect Americans.”)
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For various versions of this claim, which I believe to be a consensus view of a
deontological (as opposed to instrumentalist) conception of rights, or of duties grounding
rights claims, see, obviously, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS Bk. II (1785); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 30-34 (1977)
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many bad reasons not to honor a rights claim – reasons whose badness is overdetermined
by considerations of consequence and individual dignity. Were the force of a right’s
claim only maintained in such cases, it would have no distinctive content, but would be
simply a convenient repackaging of consequentialist considerations in a nonconsequentialist shell. The core of a deontological conception of right is that it applies
even in the face of putatively good reasons, in particular in the face of credible claims
that social welfare would be maximized in some aggregative manner by violating the
right.
It should therefore be clear why a general ethical defense of micro-necessity and a
deontological conception of right are incompatible. The necessity justification proposes
precisely what the rights claim denies: that action may be taken when the goods, taken
together, pay for the bads, as measured by the “cost” of the rights violation. An
unconstrained micro-necessity justification consists, effectively, in the forcible
conversion of a deontological ethical framework into an act-consequentialist one.

(rights as side-constraints on utility-maximization); Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre,
reprinted in MORTAL QUESTIONS 53-74 (1979) (deontological constraints as limits on
consequentialist justifications); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 80-83 (rev. ed. 1994) (agent-centered restrictions as constraints on
consequentialist justification).
Ronald Dworkin’s famous metaphor of “rights as trumps,” suggests a concept of
rights as claims that categorically defeat considerations of general policy. However,
Dworkin’s particular deployment of the concept of a right relies on a quasi-utilitarian
theory, according to which rights claims are justified when determinations of general
welfare would be corrupted by what Dworkin styles “nosy” or “external” preferences.
Such preferences are ruled out by an underlying individual right to treatment (by the state
at any rate) as an equal, entitled to respect. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); for discussion see Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 301 (2000).
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Necessity justifications leave nothing to the concept of right.
Since criminal law protects individual rights as much as social interests, one
would think this point would be obvious and consequently that theoretical discussions of
necessity would recognize the inherent limits of the defense in short order. But on the
contrary, Anglo-American criminal law theorists and treatise writers, including the
authors of the M.P.C., are typically critical of the courts for affording the necessity
defense such mingy treatment. Theorists complain about the failure of common law
courts to extend the justification from its well-recognized instances (where it typically
justifies regulatory violations, such as speeding en route to the hospital, or very local
property violations).37 And on so-called “economic” theories of criminal law, where the
point of the criminal norm is to block transactions that could, were they Paretoimproving, go through with mutual consent, the necessity defense would, indeed,
exemplify the logic of the criminal law in general – a form of “efficient breach” theory.38
To some extent, legal theorists’ quick assumption that necessity can be
assimilated into the criminal law generally reflects the contingent fact that many of these
writers have, independently, utilitarian sympathies. But the lack of attention to the
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On the potential justifiability of killing non-threats, see LAFAVE, §10.1(a); M.P.C.
COMMENTARY, §3.02, Commentary 3; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART §237 (2d ed. 1961); SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 12223 (1987). George Fletcher is a rare criminal law theorist who explicitly rejects a much
less restrictive necessity test. See his RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §10.4 (1978). J.C.
Smith notes that if English law does permit the defense to cases of homicide (unclear,
given the infamous R. v. Dudley & Stephens precedent, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884)) the
defense does not extend past cases of killing some lest all die. SMITH & HOGAN’S
CRIMINAL LAW 271-74 (10th ed. 2003).
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See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 1193-1231 (1985).
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evident incompatibility of right and necessity reflects more than ideological blinders.
There are several further factors at work. To begin with, the basic comparative-value
conditions of the necessity defense are virtually never satisfied in practice. Criminal
conduct is paradigmatically conduct that causes far more harm to the victim and society
than it gains the perpetrator, whether or not the criminal norms are themselves justified in
deontological or consequentialist terms. Were society rife with wanton Benthamites
rather than egoists, the question of necessity’s scope would be ever-present. As it is not,
the illusion of consonance is more easily maintained.
The relatively few decisions on the necessity defense meet this pattern: necessity
claims usually lose, and when they win, it is for easy cases, far short of the infliction of
violence, let alone homicide (excluding self-defense). This statement from a recent
California case, People v. Coffman, is typical: “It is not acceptable for a defendant to
decide that it is necessary to kill an innocent person in order that he (or she) may live.”39
To the extent there is any Anglo-American authority forgranting the defense in cases of
homicide, it is typically in cases (or, more often, hypotheticals) involving a choice
between certainly killing some and probably letting all die, as with shooting down a
possibly hijacked jet plane, or pulling a fear-frozen shipwreck victim from a ladder so
that others might pass, or throwing some passengers into the sea lest all drown in the
overcrowded lifeboats.40 Commentators have sought to extend this line of cases into true

39

96 P.3d 30, ¶¶ 100-02 (Cal. 2004) (denying defense on grounds in robbery-murder,
where defendant alleged co-perpetrator had threatened the life of her son as well as
herself.)
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SMITH AND HOGAN; United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 1 Wall Jr. 1 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1842). By contrast, the defense was famously denied in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, in
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trade-offs, such as the M.P.C. hypothetical in which an inhabited family farm is
deliberately flooded in order to save a town. But this highly revisionary aspect of the
M.P.C. defense has not been incorporated into law, and the fact remains that there are no
decisions in Anglo-American law, nor any documented decisions not to prosecute, in
which innocents not otherwise in harm’s way are assaulted or killed in order to avert
harm from others.41
The same appears also to be true in European jurisdictions. France’s Penal Code
exculpates a defendant who, “facing an immediate or imminent danger to himself,
another, or his property, performs an act necessary to save the person or property,
provided the means used are proportionate to the seriousness of the threat.” In principle,
the defense covers all crimes, including assault or homicide, but I have found no recorded
decisions showing even rejection of the defense in such cases.42 Germany’s Penal Code
has a virtually identical provision, called the “state of emergency” [Notwehr] defense, but
it adds a requirement that the means be “appropriate” to the harm averted. This is read by

part on the grounds that there was no reason why the cabinboy should have been killed
for food, rather than any of the others. The other ground for rejecting the defense was a
lack of imminence: Lord Coleridge, though not the jury, thought they had not waited long
enough for rescue before turning to cannibalism. For more discussion of this peculiar
case, see A.W.BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW (1984).
41

CODE PÉNAL Art.122-7, [my trans.]. In principle, the defense covers all crimes,
including assault or homicide, but I have found no recorded decisions showing even
rejection of the defense in such cases.

42

Jacques-Henri Robert writes that “although one can defend using force against
someone posing a threat to the household [patrimoine] . . . necessity will not lie against
an innocent [my trans].” DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
5th ed. 2001), p. 272. The defensible cases of necessity he instances are of the familiar
Anglo-American variety: sailors jettisoning some of their number lest all die, and
surgeons cutting flesh without consent in order to save life.
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some commentators, including George Fletcher, categorically to exclude at least
homicide from the scope of the defense. 43 Again, I have found no cases justifying
assault or killing of an innocent not already in harm’s way. Fletcher does cite one case
rejecting the defense, in which a German officer was found guilty of battery for beating
Soviet prisoners in order to interrogate them regarding whether they had been stealing
food and thereby, the officer maintained, threatening the well-being of all.44 The
standard Continental examples of successful necessity defenses are, in essence, gleaning
cases: squatters found justified in taking over abandoned housing, breaking and entering
to shelter poor children, and in principle the theft of food (though it is generally
impossible to show that theft was the only option).45
This leads to the two positive, deeper, reasons why legal commentators and moral
philosophers continue to discuss micro-necessity as though it were easily compatible with
systems of rights. First is the deontologist’s embarrassment at the stance’s apparent
absolutism, its rejection of any concessions to catastrophic considerations in the name of
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DEUTSCHES STRAFGESETZ §§ 32-34. German and French criminal law do, unlike
Anglo-American law, in principle permit the excuse of duress for killing of the innocent,
as does the I.C.C. Statute, §31(1)(d), although the homicide limitation had been
recognized before, e.g. in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), IT-26-92,
judgment of 7 October 1997. For discussion, see GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 146 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005). In German
law, interrogatory torture is subject to multiple specific prohibitions, apart from any
inherent limitations in the necessity defense. Notwithstanding the prohibitions, in a
recent article Winfried Brugger performs interesting interpretive acrobatics to show how
torture might be justified under German law. May Government Ever Use Torture? Two
Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (2000).
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FLETCHER, RETHINKING, p. 784.
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ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL, 272; FLETCHER, §10.2.
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right. Fiat justitia, pereat mundus ought to be disproof of a moral theory, not its motto.
To reckon with the embarrassment, rights-enthusiasts therefore declare themselves
deontologists up to a “threshold” of “disaster,” after which point welfare considerations
are taken to dominate rights claims.46 But the solution of positing a threshold only makes
the embarrassment more acute, since once the threshold establishes the principle of
individual rights/general welfare tradeoffs, all that is left is dickering over the price. This
is, of course, the intellectual force of the ticking-bomb hypothetical, which I turn to
below.
To be sure, as a formal matter one can define the force of a rights claim
discontinuously, so that it blocks all utilitarian considerations but only to a point. But
describing such a discontinuity is one thing and justifying it is quiteanother. In fact, the
problem of thresholds is only a special instance of the deepest, and most notorious,
puzzle about deontological conceptions: the so-called paradox of rights. This paradox
inheres in the fact that rights claims bar consideration of consequences even when these
consequences include identical (and larger-scale) rights-violations. Thus,one person’s
right not to be killed (or murdered) will not be outweighed by the benefit of saving two,
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Leading claimants of the threshold theory are Nagel, War and Massacre, e.g., or
Personal Rights and Public Space, reprinted in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 31-52, 66
(2002); NOZICK, ANARCHY 41; and CHARLES FRIED, RIGHTS AND WRONG (1978). But
some version of the position is nearly universal among non-instrumental rights theorists.
Michael Moore uses the metaphor of the dam: welfarist considerations build up on one
side of the deontological dam, until finally they spill over. But the dam remains, and
returns once the waters recede. Although the image is apt, it also merely describes, rather
than explains, how deontological principles could function in this way; they of course
have no underlying physical anchor, as does a literal dam. Michael Moore, Torture and
the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. R. 280, 332 (1989). For discussion, see Larry
Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L.R. 893 (2000).
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or more, others from being killed (or murdered). How can the considerations thatsupport
honoring the right on one side of the relation not simultaneously demand honoring it on
the other side? At this point, philosophers have mainly described rather than argued for
stances and commitments consistent with tolerating the paradox: that the value of the
person protected by the right is not aggregable across persons, but instead simply
demands respect,47 or that the reasons supporting rights claims are in the form of
principled demands, not invitations to maximize.48
These formulations are appealing but they are not justifications. Each might be
seen as expressing a conception of individuals as free and equal beings, with lives of
individual and distinct value. This was Kant’s view, and whether or not one accepts his
argument for it on the basis of rational necessity, it remains a deeply entrenched and
fundamentally attractive feature of modern political and ethical thought. Nozick has put
the point poignantly: “[Using] a person [for another’s gain] does not sufficiently respect
and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.”49
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This is Nagel’s position, as well as Frances Kamm’s, in her Non-consequentialism, the
Person, as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
381-89 (1992); both are interpretations of Kant’s claim in the Groundwork that the value
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But the paradox remains, especially in the face of catastrophe, when the actor is faced
with a choice between honoring the value in one instance and countenancing its
destruction many times over.
Let us look quickly at the infamous ticking-bomb, which can seem to present that
puzzle in a particularly troubling way. In the standard story, an interrogator is faced with
a terrorist who has planted a bomb that will kill many of innocent citizens. Torturing the
terrorist is the last, best hope for saving them
. T he first thing to be said, and the first
thing that was said, in Henry Shue’s seminal article twenty-five years ago, is that at best
the ticking-bomb hypothetical is of virtually no practical significance, and at worst it is
utterly corrupt in the illicit conclusions it invites.50 The hypothetical gains its force from
its stipulatively perfect satisfaction of all the traditional criteria of necessity: the
interrogator is certain of the threat and its attendant costs, knows that the person to be
tortured is responsible for the bomb, and is reasonably certain that torturing him is the
sole means of avoiding catastrophe and is likely to be effective. While under these
conditions, there might be widespread consensus that torture would be justifiable, relax
any of the dimensions of justification -- maybe it’s a hoax, maybe it’s the wrong guy,
maybe the interrogator has chosen to torture the terrorist’s child instead, maybe the
suspect will lie – and dissensus emerges immediately.
In the real world, it is most likely that some or all of the traditional criteria will be
unsatisfied. Moreover, institutions and institutional actors tend to abuse the limits of
their discretion, and coerced confessions are demonstrably of inferior intelligence quality
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Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 124-43, 142-43 (1978).
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to detective work.51 For all these reasons, there is no way to institutionalize any principle
of permissible torture without falling into the swamp of Abu Ghraibs and Bagrams, in
which innocents are routinely subjected to abuse for the amusement of sadists playing
“intelligence” games.52 All of these points were evident on September 12th, 2001, even if
they might have been forgotten in the heat of the moment. To the extent that the Bybee
memo goes beyond the hypothetical exploration of an ex post defense to a charge of
torture and actually lays out ex ante an institutional space for torture, I believe it is
tantamount to criminal complicity.53
With all these considerations against it, it might seem hard to account for the
persistence of the ticking bomb hypothetical. Since the conditions under which its
conclusion results never actually obtain, it might be best to treat it as a kind of ethical
“singularity”: a black-hole that swallows up intuition and lets nothing emerge. But, in
fact, the ticking bomb example is no harmless anomaly. It persists because of a series of
related mistakes in thinking about rights under pressure from welfare, and how to
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John Langbein quotes Sir James FitzJames Stephen’s A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
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I defend these claims in The Lawyers Know Sin, and Causeless Complicity. Briefly,
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torture, and for purposefully abetting acts, in reckless disregard of the risks, that led,
through recklessness or negligence, to the deaths of some of the detainees.
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conceive the role of necessity in these cases. Necessity really does justify overriding
some kinds of rights claims in many instances, but these are rights of a fundamentally
different nature from the ones involved in the ticking bomb example. Criminal theorists
have over-generalized the appropriate normative scope of the necessity defense by
confusing those rights whose abrogation the defense can legitimately justify with all
rights.
Let us put aside, for a moment, the cases of torture and ticking bombs and shift to
the law of torts and property. As controversial as a legal decision authorizing homicide
or torture would be, so uncontroversial are decisions in tort cases likeVincent v. Lake
Erie Transp. Co., or Ploof v. Putnam54 -- intentional trespasses upon property clearly
justified as necessary under the choices of evils at hand. So clear is the force of the
necessity defense in such cases that no prosecutor would consider them
, and the question
of justice is simply who should pay the costs. As I discussed above, criminal necessity
defenses are generally found to lie in affronts to property rights, as well as to violations
of regulations that impair no rights.55 The difference might be thought simply a matter of
the relatively weaker interests at play, property versus life, but I think it goes deeper than
that, to the kind of right the law of property protects, versus the kind of right protected by
homicide law – or, in the instant case, by§2340 and the massive body of international
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treaty and customary law that stands behind it. This is the difference between what I
want to call institutional and pre-institutional rights.56
Institutional rights are the rights consequentialists defend: individual claims
secured by a general promise that their respect will promote welfare. Pre-institutional
rights, by contrast, are claims that institutions must honor, and the institutions’ basic
justice or legitimacy is assessed by reference to these claims. At least since David Hume,
property rights have been broadly understood to be of the institutional sort, both
philosophically and positively: they constitute a conventional system of assigning
ownership whose specific forms are grounded instrumentally, not in claims of natural
right. As a matter of positive law, informal social institutions, and economic
arrangement, this point is clearly true. There is simply no way to understand our
complex system of divided interests and fractionated claims, much less to justify the
economic systems that depend upon them, except on an instrumental, conventionalist
basis.57
Within contemporary philosophical thought, to the extent that views of property
rights as natural have any lingering force, it is largely to defend claims that the capacity
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1999).
57

See Elizabeth Anderson’s interesting reflections that Lockean property rights would be
incompatible with the conditions of modern capitalism: “How Not to Complain About
Taxes II,” < http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2005/01/why_i_reject_na.html>. In the
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respective Writings and Discoveries.”
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to own property must be conceived pre-institutionally, or that individuals must have some
minimum of personal property in order to be recognizable as equal subjects under law.58
Even if one accepts the most prominent version of a stronger, Lockean theory of preinstitutional property rights, that of Robert Nozick, this theory does nothing to vindicate
current patterns of holdings, or the legal doctrines that prevent disturbances to those
patterns. Current patterns of holdings, on any realistic view, are built on histories of
force and fraud, and cannot be consistent with any understanding of what pre-institutional
rights to acquisition and transfer would demand. As an account of the way in which
property is normatively conceived today, we are deeply committed to both
conventionalism and instrumentalism.59
Now, the problem with instrumentalist conceptions of rights is that they only
work well in the easy cases, when honoring them also promotes welfare. For this reason,
they are commonly regarded as pseudo-rights. Given some natural assumptions about the
value of stable institutional expectations, many cases will turn out to be easy, and markets
transferring those rights can function efficiently. But sometimes the instrumental
calculus points the other way, even taking into account indefinite future costs and
benefits. And when defenders of an instrumentally-justified right are faced with the clear
choice – respect the right or promote welfare – they must opt for welfare, on pain of

58

These are, roughly, the “personality theory” views of Kant and Hegel, well-discussed
by JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1990); Margaret Jane Radin is
a modern inheritor of these views; see her CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1991).
59

In these paragraphs I have oversimplified grotesquely. I discuss the failings of preinstitutional property theories at greater length in Justice in Reparations: The Cost of
Memory and the Value of Talk, 32 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 277-312 (2004).
31

being accused of deontological “rule-worship.”60 The consequence is that
instrumentally-justified rights must go hand-in-hand with an unrestricted limit of
necessity: the right will be respected so long, and only so long, as that respect pays out in
the long term aggregation of welfare.
We know what an explicit version of such a scheme looks like because we live
with it everyday: Takings doctrine, according to which property rights are secure so long,
and only so long, as the state has not determined that the public would not further benefit
from an alternative use of the property.61 The recent Kelo62decision perfectly represents
the instability of an instrumental approach to property. As Thomas Merrill has observed,
what was chiefly remarkable about Kelo was the public furor it evoked, notwithstanding
its unremarkableness as a piece of doctrine.63 Kelo simply followed doctrinally in a long
line of cases permitting takings that the state could justify by reference to some
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of Utilitarian Ethics, in Smart and Bernard Williams, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST (1973). Contrary to Smart, I do not want to claim that rule-utilitarianism
“collapses into” – is extensionally equivalent to – act-utilitarianism. As Donald Regan
has shown, rule-based forms of utilitarianism can promote utility in a way that
individualistic act-utilitarianism cannot, by solving coordination problems.
UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION (1980). But the case at issue here is not
coordination-dependent.
61

Note that while the point of the “just compensation” requirement is to push takings in
the direction of Pareto-efficiency, given that actual compensation is frequently less than
the owner’s subjective value, the actual normative justification is more Kaldor-Hicks than
Pareto. A different version of the same principle is at work in the Vincent cases: there
will be no criminal liability, assuming Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and then ex post
compensation to bring the transfer to “objective” Pareto standards.
62

Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. __ (2005).

63

Testimony of Thomas A. Merrill to Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 19, 2005,
accessible at < http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit_id=4661>.
32

aggregative benefit, independent of any formalistic requirement of public “use.”
Translate “public use” into “public necessity,” in Blackstone’s phrase, and it is clear that
Takings law embodies the concept of micro-necessity.64 Whatever substantive criteria of
judicial review remain in Takings doctrine can best be seen as forcing the assessments of
competing values in the direction of the certainty of a welfare gain. When the contingent,
instrumentalist foundations of property rights were suddenly laid bare for all to see in the
ensuing media coverage, public uproar was entirely to be expected, at least by those who
feared their property might become subject to public use or necessity.
There is another scene where rights become uniformlysubject to necessity, and
that ought to disrupt more than bourgeois complacency.65 This is the scene of civilians
caught in war, where rights to life are balanced against aggregative concerns. Under the
principles and agreements of International Humanitarian Law/the Law of Armed
Conflict, while civilians or their property may not be directly targeted, they may
incidentally be killed or their property destroyed, subject to military necessity.66 Their
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rights to life and property are to be respected, so far and only so far as that respect is not
overly costly to the tactical goals of the military commanders. This form of utilitarianism
is more restrictive, insofar as potentially optimal strategies of targeting civilians are
categorically ruled out, and insofar as the requirements of “necessity” and
“proportionality” are supposed to have more bite than simple weighing of costs versus
benefits. But the consequences of this regime for civilians caught in war areenormous .
The invading and subsequently occupying U.S. military in Iraq is probably as disciplined
and effective as any force in history at attempting to keep civilian casualties within the
guidelines of international law. The effect is that rights generally honored in nearabsolute terms become subject to a highly institutionalized and conventionalized
calculus, whereby target-planners route their proposals through military lawyers to ensure
conformity with law. Even so, estimates of civilian casualties directly traceable to U.S.
(or coalition) actions are in the range of 7-10,000 dead, with estimates of total civilian
deaths in the range of 25-30,000.67 And these are the good times for civilians caught in
war: estimates of civilian/combatant casualty ratios for the twentieth century as a whole
range from 2 to 10: 1.
My point is not that war is terrible for civilians. It is rather to suggest what a
regime of rights limited by necessity looks like. Importantly, the regime of legal rights

more like egoism than utilitarianism, albeit constrained by protection of the innocent
from deliberate targeting.
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against torture does not look like this, any more than the right against homicide in
domestic law looks like the right to property under the discipline of the Takings clause.
That the right against torture is not like this, not subject to instrumental calculation, is –
ironically – perhaps most evident at war, where the torture of even a captured combatant
with tactical knowledge is absolutely proscribed.68 This point had become so deeply
embedded in the law and training of the modern military before the Iraq and Afghanistan
invasions and occupations that no one was more angry about the attempt by the civilian
leadership of the Bush administration to relax the rules on interrogation than the
professional military, especially its lawyers and officers – in particular, in Bush’s terms,
to subordinate detainee rights against inhumane treatment to “military necessity.”69 What
disturbed the officers, apart from concerns about reciprocity inflicted upon our own
soldiers, was that a right specifically excluded from the instrumental calculus was now
included. For the right against torture, along withthe other rights violation of which
constitutes grave breach of the Geneva framework,70 are the background set of principles
against which the particular institutions, permissions and conventions of war are
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to imagine what else now-Attorney General Gonzales had in mind by labeling as “quaint”
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justified.71 To put it positively, they are the pre-institutional backdrop against which the
institution itself can legitimately be maintained. With no restriction on torture or
execution of non-combatants, there can be no permission to kill combatants in war.
A full account of the force of the right against torture wouldfocus on the peculiar
horror of torture, the combination of suffering with the deliberate subordination of the
victim’s consciousness to the will of the interrogator.72 But it would share with the
peacetime right against homicide a commitment to the value of the individual life, a value
that cannot be aggregated, or so our legal and moral theories have generally presumed.
The scene of torture, in the imagination of those who reject it, makes the nature of this
value especially clear: the interrogee is not confronted as a part of an armed host, but as
an individual, already disarmed and vulnerable.73 This is the field of basic, preinstitutional human rights. There can be something unfortunate about Dworkin’s oftinvoked metaphor of “rights as trumps.” The metaphor suggests that rights are moves in
a game, and that the game is separable from the players. This might be an appropriate
picture of rights in a court of law introduced as part of a debate about what ought to be
done. But there is no argument in the torture chamber; there is merely one person
preparing to do violence to another. In such a context, rights are simply constraints on
how one person may treat another. They may not be observed, but they exist as moral
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victim least human, as Hannah Arendt observed of the concentration camp inmates.
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claims whether or not the justificatory game is played.
In criminal law, the defense of necessity runs out when it confronts preinstitutional rights, whose value is not the product of an instrumental, welfarist calculus.74
My point is not that we could not conceive it in these terms, nor even that we do not,
since obviously some people do. My point is that our most deeply sedimented bodies of
common law and our clearest positive prohibitions reflect a deeply held conviction that
we ought not value rights against torture or killing in this way. Criminal law theorists
have commonly remarked that the absolute value of life shows that the law is “not
utilitarian after all.”75 It would be more precise to say that the law responds in a
utilitarian fashion to institutional rights, and a non-utilitarian fashion to pre-institutional
rights.

IV. Necessities at war: Fact versus Justification
I have so far argued that we operate across ethics, politics and law with two
distinct concepts of rights. Institutional, instrumentally justified rights, of which property
rights are exemplary, are subject to override by what I have called a micro-necessity
justification. But pre-institutional rights, which reflect a conception of the distinct value
of individuals, are as a conceptual matter immune to micro-necessity overrides.
Assertion of a necessity justification in their face simply denies their deontological status.
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Rights against torture are core examples of pre-institutional rights and so it follows
logically that they are immune from violation justified by necessity.
But, while recognizing this distinction helps to make clear why necessity
justifications have the limits they do, this does nothing to solve the puzzle posed by the
ticking-bomb case, or more generally by the paradox of rights. Pernicious as the example
is, it still demands a rational account, for it puts great pressure on the essential element of
deontological reasoning: its categorical, exceptionless character. If justified departure is
not the response, what is?
At this point it is worth paying even closer attention to the way the standard
necessity justification is not really about necessity, but about the conditions under which
actors may exercise judgment to depart from conventionally secured rules. As I
explained above, real, existential necessity does not play a role in the necessity defense:
in the real world, there can never be absolute certainty that the threatened harms will
materialize, or that there are no other options, or that the strategy in question will be
effective. Functionally, the necessity justification is an ex post application of an ex ante
(and unconfirmable) probabilistic weighing of various courses of action. But in the
hypothetical, idealized case, the ticking-bomb example does confront us with real
necessity, if only in our imaginations. Confronted by real, existential necessity, we find
that our principles yield. But we must be precise about what this means. The image of
ourselves torturing, or authorizing torture, is not a deduction from ethical principles. It is
rather a recognition that our principles could imaginably be unable towithstand the
pressure from concrete opposing values.
This may seem a peculiar, even unintelligible, claim: that we can respond to
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necessity in a way that neither excuses (for we are responsible for our choices) nor
justifies. It is, all the same, a familiar stance, one whose invisibility is itself a product of
its familiarity. Bernard Williams’ magnificent account of ancient Greek ethical thought,
Shame and Necessity, provides a possible model in its discussion of slavery. Chattel
slavery was an ordinary and deeply rooted part of ancient Greek life, and the economies
of the city-states pervasively depended upon it. It was a kind of chance that made people
– mostly non-Greek-speaking peoples, to be sure – into slaves: the chance of being
captured at war, or by slave-hunters. Whatis essential to Williams’ account is that this
chance-like feature of slavery was widely recognized by Greeks. They saw it, he says,
as “arbitrary and cruel,” as “a paradigm of disaster, of which any rational person would
complain.” All the same, it was a part of their world, and they lacked the imagination, or
the will, to put anything else in its place. As a consequence, Williams says, they saw the
slavery system “not just but necessary.” They treated slavery as necessary in fact but
derived no lesson of justification from this necessity.76
Aristotle, however, departed from this stance. He did not merely accept slavery,
but actively defended it. In the Politics, he set himself the task of showing why the slave
system was not only necessary but also just.77 Prefiguring later racist ideology, Aristotle
argued that slaves were essentially animals rather than humans, suited by nature to be
coerced by their masters, who in turn were suited by nature to rule.78 Regarding this step
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from necessity in fact to justification, Williams remarks, “if there is something worse
than accepting slavery, it consists in defending it.”79
Why should this be so? Why not think that the attempt to offer a justification for
a disputed practice at least credits the power of reason, as mute acceptance does not – the
tribute of vice to virtue, in the words of La Rochefoucauld? In cases of genuine
normative dispute, the practice of seeking justification in terms of broader principles is
part of the underlying practice of ethics itself. But when the acts or institutions to be
justified present, on their face, such a disruption to ordinary principles of ethical thought
– in slavery’s case, concerning the lives people hope to lead -- the practice of
justification looks more like rationalization than genuinely ethical deliberation.
I do not mean to downplay the danger on the other side, of mistaking mutable
human institutions or natural circumstances as insuperable necessities. The Greeks
clearly did so, seeing false necessity in the institutions they knew. If the stance of
accepting necessity as fact makes sense, it does so only at the moment of crisis, when the
appearance of necessity is challenged at the forefront, both intellectually and practically;
and when a return to ordinary principles comes quickly. The sedimentation of necessity
into routine practice is the obverse of justification’s transformation into rationalization.

For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord
and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is [] by
nature a slave. . . . For [nature] is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the
Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every
instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. [Jowett
trans.]
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Thus, my point is not that the Greeks were right to accept slavery as necessary, nor that
blind acceptance of an injustice is better than a fallaciously justified acceptance. My
point (and Williams’) is that, given a people who see slavery (or another injustice) as
necessary, at least let them see it as a brute and inevitable affront to their principles, not
as something their principles can domesticate and make safe to perpetuate.80 Let this
hypothetical people indeed marshal their principles – as the Greeks did not – in a struggle
against the perceived necessary evil, and not work to accommodate it on the level of
principle, lest they fall – as Aristotle did – into outright justification.

V: Macro-necessity and the Politics of Existence
As a matter of constitutional principle the Bybee memo insists, and more general
administration arguments urge, that the existential demands of the nation limit the force
of law. As I argued in Part II, the Bybee memo essentially put forward an argument that
ordinary, constitutionally-limited politics, understood as Congressional regulation of the
armed forces, must yield to the necessities of war, determined by the judgments of the
executive. This I called macro-necessity. I want to argue now for two claims. First,
there is an instructive parallel to the Bybee memo’s political theory of macro-necessity in
the political theory of Carl Schmitt – instructive because the weaknesses and dangers of
Schmitt’s theory are exactly the weaknesses and dangers here. And second, I will argue
that the theory of macro-necessity repeats the mistake of micro-necessity, confusing
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necessity as fact with necessity as justification. By removing politics from the restraint
of the principles that legitimate it, the theory of macro-necessity makes necessity into a
device for overriding all rights, in the name of the security of a nation whose political
identity has perforce been lost.
The OLC lawyers are of course not the first to argue for a doctrine of emergency
powers, motivated by political necessity. Extraordinary legal powers have been part of
the constitutional imagination since at least the ancient Roman Constitution, under which
the Senate could direct the appointment of a dictator, who would then rule Italy by decree
until the danger had passed.81 Although celebrated by Machiavelli and Rousseau, this
personal model of emergency rule has generally given way in modern thought to a
legalistic model, in which an ordinary office such as the Presidency, rather than an
individual, is temporarily invested with extraordinary powers, usually by reference to
explicit constitutional provisions. 82 European constitutions, including the French
Constitution of 1958 and Italy’s Republican Constitution, formalized provisions for states
of emergence, while the Anglo-American constitutional tradition has preferred to leave
them informal (although traces of such thinking can be seen in the U.S. Constitution’s
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provision for legislative suspension of habeas corpus).83 The exception has frequently
been noted, and during the Cold War, when a post-nuclear state of emergency was
envisioned, conservative political theorist Clinton Rossiter argued for legislation to
provide for a Roman-style commissarial dictatorship during times of emergency.84
As part of a general theory of broad executive power, the Bush Administration
has not sought to make sense of national necessity through the forms of law. As I
mentioned above, the chief argument underlying the assertion of the President’s suprastatutory authority in times of national emergency is frankly functional: the Constitution
is, at bottom, a plan for state survival, and it must be construed to provide the means
adequate to survival. Since, by hypothesis, only supra-statutory executive authority is
sufficient to ensure survival, the Constitution must legitimate this authority. The
Constitution, on this view, demands that its own framework of separated and balanced
powers be subsumed by the goal underlying that framework, across a broad range of
contexts calling, at first instance, for executive action. Law, which as a conceptual matter
aims to provide reasonably determinate criteria demarcating the legitimate from the
illegitimate, becomes instead a general imperative: the executive should do what needs to
be done. The job of law is essentially to get out of the way.
Certainly many presidents in U.S. history have argued for, and acted upon, a
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presumption of extra-statutory authority.85 Most famous, of course, were Jefferson’s
purchase of the Louisiana territories, and Lincoln’s expansion of the Army and
suspension of habeas corpus. Both presidents justified their acts by reference to public
necessity. But, as Jules Lobel and Daniel Farber have argued, both also accepted the
authority of the law they broke, seeking post-hoc Congressional ratification, and holding
themselves responsible to the legal consequences should that ratification not be
forthcoming.86 On this view, states of emergency occur at the brink of legitimacy. We
must therefore be careful to distinguish what must be done from what can be done under
principles of justified authority.
The Bush Administration has taken a different course. Rather than concede
legitimacy to actions taken within constraining constitutional structure, it broadened the
definition of legitimacy to include all situationally-governed, executive decisions in the
field of war. Put aside historiographic claims whether this is a plausible interpretation of
the Framers or Ratifiers’ views of executive power.87 The real roots of the position are
theoretical, and are better illustrated by the early work of German constitutional theorist,
Carl Schmitt, who was prompted by the threats of both right and left radical politics to
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Rakove argues persuasively in Making Foreign Policy, supra note [xx], that such a
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Weimar’s democracy to undertake an investigation into the relation between states of
emergency and political authority.88 During the 1920’s and early 1930’s, when Schmitt
produced a wide-ranging theory of politics, law, and legitimacy, the Weimar government
functioned substantially under the authority given to the Reich President (then
Hindenburg) by Article 48 of the Constitution of 1919.89 Article 48 permitted the
President to “take the measures necessary to reestablish law and order, if necessary using
armed force,” and “[i]n the pursuit of this aim,” to suspend specified civil rights, notably
rights of privacy, free expression, assembly, and security of home.90
In a debate with the leading lights of German liberalism (notably Hans Kelsen),
Schmitt argued for an expansive understanding of the President’s emergency authority, as
including but not restricted to the particular powers mentioned. Thus, according to
Schmitt, Article 48 specified the particular civil rights that could be suspended, while
enabling all other manner of extra-legal authority.91 While Schmitt was mindful of the
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danger that a dictator charged with returning the state to normal politics might simply
perpetuate his own extraordinary rule, he thought the attempt to restrict a dictator through
legal forms was both practically mistaken and intellectually dishonest. As a practical
matter, a restrictive understanding of the Reich President’s emergency powers might
prevent him from actually defeating internal political threats to the republic – threats
generated by those who, like the Nazis and the communists, used the forms of legal
process to subvert the constitutional order. As Schmitt colorfully puts it, “In the
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become
torpid by repetition.”92
As a theoretical matter, the liberal argument mistook the real nature of
sovereignty, conflating genuine legitimacy, which resides in an executive’s protection of
the will and real interests of a people, with formal legality. According to Schmitt, law is
a system of governance designed to cope with specific circumstances – not,
fundamentally, a system of normative authority, as in Kelsen’s view.93 Necessarily, law
will encounter legally ungovernable situations, and those situations will demand action
by someone in a position to act. The key claim for Schmitt, as for Bush, is that this
practical demand for decision and action itself imparts authority, as shown by the popular
acceptance of emergency rule. To put it another way, actual political authority shows
that authority is logically prior to law. Thus Schmitt’s most famous pronouncement:
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“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”94 Real political authority lies with him
who can suspend the law, not with him bound to it. Or, using the tag of Hobbes that
Schmitt takes as leitmotif: auctoritas, non veritas fecit legem. Authority, not truth, makes
law.95
For Schmitt, the claim that sovereignty consists essentially in the power to rule
beyond law captures the core of a broader theory that can be called existential politics.
Existential politics means making central the concepts of order and national identity, and
making peripheral the formal processes of legislation and administration. This model of
politics is seen in Schmitt’s other famous aphorism, that “The specific political
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend
and enemy.”96 According to Schmitt, just as aesthetics can be summarized in terms of
developing criteria for distinguishing the beautiful from the ugly, or economics the
profitable from the unprofitable, so politics consists in making and deploying a
distinction between “friends,” or co-members of the unified state, and its “enemies,” or
those with whom the state is in actual or potential conflict.97 But unlike aesthetics or
economics, whose distinctions supervene on independent characteristics of the objects in
their domain, political action itself contributes the characterizations as friend or enemy.
Schmitt writes that the friend-enemy distinction is independent of any other distinctions,
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moral or factual. Prior to governance, friendship and enmity (or peace and war) are fluid,
depending on mutable affinities and coalitions. Politics gives sharp borders to those
concepts. Politics is “existential,” both in that it serves as the basic logical principle of
identity – and therefore of conflict – in the world, and in that it serves as the very real
condition of physical survival or death.98
Existential politics is Hobbesian politics, seeing everything through the lens of
conflict. In the absence of politics there is only individualized conflict; politics renders
conflict collective by monopolizing force within the collective (thus making “friends”),
and holding the potential enemies of the collective at sword’s point. Maintaining order
by policing the friend-enemy line is therefore the central task of political authorities, the
condition of all “ordinary” political processes. Since law is a product of ordinary politics,
order is also the condition of law. And since the executive’s task is to create order, his
sovereign authority must thereby transcend law, deciding when ordinary politics can take
place, and when instead it must be accepted. Legitimacy resides instead in a people’s
acquiescence, understood as non-resistance, to the concrete problem-solving capacities of
“administrative” political authority, and while Schmitt maintained that executive
authority in contexts of emergency was “democratic,” this amounts largely to plebiscitary
basis in popular acclamation.99 In principle, executive decisionmaking is meant to be
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constrained by respect for what Schmitt came to term the “concrete orders” of society –
the organic, deep social structure provided principally by religious and civil institutions.
On this view, legitimacy is partly functional, or “decisional,” and partly organic. But
since structural separation of powers is a key instance of the misguided emphasis on
legalism that both obscures real political agency and prevents state responses to genuine
existential threats, only the executive determines what these concrete orders demand. 100
Schmitt’s concept on sovereignty as decisional, but rooted in pre-legal ordering
reflects his longstanding cultural and political conservativism. But his increased
emphasis on it coincides both with Schmitt’s joining of the Nazi party and with the
Nazis’ claim to root their authority not just in response to Weimar’s chaos (inflicted by
themselves), but in their capacity to represent and defend real Germanness, there is a
lively debate whether Schmitt’s move reflects intellectual conservativism as much as
political opportunism. Certainly he offered the Nazis a theoretical grounding they could,
and did, make use of.101
In our current context, however, Schmitt’s eventual embrace of fascism, through
the vehicle of a myth of a legitimating popular spirit, is less interesting than the basic
move of relocating legitimacy to the space before law. For in their common emphasis on
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the existential demands of order and the need for swift response, there are clear
connections between Schmitt’s theory of existential politics and the Bush
Administration’s macro-necessity justifications for executive overrides of legislative
authority.102 Like Schmitt, the Bush Administration sees national security in time of
attack as providing a sufficient justification for expanded, extra-legal executive authority,
and thereby treats the Constitution as enabling swift and flexible response to enemies of
the state. Its broad reading of the Commander-in-Chief power and its reluctance to seek
specific legal authority for its acts are precisely Schmittian in their view of legal forms as
inimical to national needs.103 Most importantly, the Administration’s theory of wartime
executive power echoes the errors of Schmitt’s argument as well – indeed, it deepens
those errors, by extending the argument from national survival to national security.
The common errors of both Carl Schmitt and the Bush administration are twofold:
first, they confuse a condition of the possibility of politics, and of the identity of a polity,
with an essentialist claim about politics and political identity; and second (and relatedly)
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they confuse the limits of constitutional principle with a justification for disregarding
constitutionalism altogether. Taken together, these errors literally threaten to destroy an
alternative conception of political legitimacy, one rooted in a conception of political
identity that is prior to executive action but not reducible to legislation. This conception
of legitimacy, our post-Hobbesian legacy of the Enlightenment, can recognize necessity,
but must not surrender to it. Because these points mirror my discussion of microjustifications of necessity, I now proceed quickly.
Hobbes, like Schmitt, saw an evident truth: without order there can be no politics.
As a logical matter, the first question about political authority is whether it is effective in
securing order. At the limit, when total disorder or other forms of political extinction
become live possibilities, then the only task for political authorities is to preserve or
reconstitute order. The question, however, is what follows from this point. For Schmitt,
what followed was a claim about the essence of politics, not about the conditions of its
possibility. Politics, viewed clearly enough, is nothing other than the work of order; and
the identity of a given state is just a reflection of that order. But this is surely a mistake.
In ordinary times, when order persists, the essence of politics is familiar: allocating
scarce resources, administering projects and personnel, securing justice. Schmitt’s
radicalism lies in seeing that ordinary political activity as basically epiphenomenal,
whereas real politics involves either the stability work of the executive, or the cultural
work of social institutions. Ordinary politics, the bread and butter of legislative
supremacy, becomes degraded in Schmitt’s view, as a deracinated technocracy; and in the
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modern view as a rent-seeking market for legislative favors.104
Displacing politics so is a mistake. Under conditions of cultural and ideological
pluralism, ordinary politics is the vehicle through which a political community
determines and expresses its identity and its commitments, its conception of social justice
and collective ambition. Just because that identity can be threatened by war does not
mean that it does not have content independent of the conditions of existence. Today,
any executive claim to legitimacy in organic cultural order would smack of fascism. In a
post-9/11 world, claims of national security cannot be dismissed airily. But to collapse
the notion of legitimacy in times of war, or some intermediate state that is warlike, but of
indefinite extension and with unclear adversaries, into pure functionalism, is to fall prey
to the pure decisionism that Schmitt himself tried to avoid. It creates a category of
“nation” eviscerated of all internal structure.
The parallel to the individual case is irresistible. It is a brute metaphysical fact
about me that my identity is anchored in the chance pairing of the chromosomal DNA of
my parents. And it is a brute existential fact about me that when my cellular activity
ceases, I cease. But in between those twin facts lie the form and matter of my identity,
the shape of my life. Those facts are striking reflections of the limits of my existence, but
they are not illuminating. They provide no answer to the individual question: what
should I do? That question, asked in the everyday context, can only be answered by
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reference to the web of my beliefs, commitments, and values. Schmitt’s equation of the
political with the scene of actual and political conflict is akin to equating the individual
life with the scene of chromosomal pairing and decay. The basic question of politics,
asked outside the context of crisis, is what should we do? And that question gets no help
from considering the demands of order in states of emergency. To think otherwise is to
empty the notion of political identity of both the form – our constitutional DNA as it were
– and the matter – our collective values and commitments – which represent the work of
a nation operating across historical time. This is not to invoke any metaphysically
spooky notion of a unified people existing across time, but only the familiar idea of a
national political identity, residing in the agency of individuals and forged through
enduring legal and cultural commitments. 105 The true concept of the political lies in the
actions of that people, engaged in ordinary politics.
The Bybee memo’s parallel mistake is to conceive “national security” in similarly
vacuous terms, as the target of executive action, without respect for the content of the
nation to be secured. When hijacked jets strike our towers and kill our citizens, or when
roadside bombs and ambushes kill our soldiers, there is of course real suffering, real
death. But it would be gross exaggeration to say that the security of the nation is
threatened just because some its members are killed. The nation is rendered unsecure
only when its identity and existence comes under siege. The Civil War posed such a
threat in America; and many other nations have also faced (and succumbed to) genuine
existential threats, sometimes for the better for their people, sometimes for the worse.
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Thus, the assessment of Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus comes far
closer (if not passes) the bar of real constitutional necessity.106 But terrible as the
casualties are in our contemporary struggle with Al Qaeda, that struggle does not rise to
the level of existential threat. With sufficient nuclear material, it might; but prospective
necessity is not necessity in fact. States must plan for emergencies, to be sure; but
planning is not a sufficient basis for lifting the structures of legitimacy.
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which, without exaggeration, we can see an
existential threat to our identity, and this comes from the threat to the structure of our
governance, and to the content of our normative commitments, at risk by the policies of
the Bush administration. This is the second error: Schmitt’s (and the Administration’s)
failure to distinguish between recognizing the limits of constitutionalism and
subordinating it to exigency. Legal and political theorists of very different political
stripes have recognized that constitutions are made for normal times, and that the
ordinary processes and balances they require may make impossible a rapid response to
acute threats to the existence of a state.107 In situations of genuine crisis, as Rousseau
wrote, it would be wrong “to make political institutions so strong as to render it
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impossible to suspend their operation.”108 The question is what to do about this point.
One possibility is to treat constitutional structure as a heuristic, a rough and ready guide
to ordinary political effectiveness, to be suspended when circumstances indicate that the
guidance of the rule is unlikely to be optimal. This is, in effect, what constitutionalism
became in Weimar, as continuous states of emergency led to governance almost entirely
under the aegis of Article 48. This is constitutionalism as non-constitutionalism, whereby
Schmitt’s aphorism about sovereignty becomes self-fulfilling prophecy. The weakness
of the heuristic model precisely mirrors the weaknesses of act-utilitarianism in moral
thought: all distinctive values, for example political rights against tyrannical domination,
or moral rights against torture, are subsumed by a general value of welfare. The rules
that ordinarily serve as vehicles for those values become so riddled by exception that the
values themselves are lost.
It is not hard to come by alternatives to heuristic constitutionalism, though there is
much debate concerning the optimal choice for emergency measures: whether formal or
informal provision for emergency, in what ways the temporary character of the provision
should be ensured, and so forth. What is beyond controversy is Rousseau’s next point,
that “none but the greatest dangers can counterbalance that of changing the public order,
and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the
country is at stake.”109 What therefore is most important, as a matter of institutional
design, is creating institutions to repel claims of constitutional necessity, not to
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accommodate them. It does no dishonor to a principled commitment against torture to
recognize its limits in the hypothetical of the ticking-bomb, nor do we dishonor a general
commitment to life’s value by insisting so long as we can that the hypothetical is
imaginary, that we remain outside the state of emergency until we can no longer resist its
existential claim. Similarly, we do not dishonor our constitutional system, our structured
system of sovereign legitimacy, to recognize its limits in extremis. We would only
dishonor it by entering too quickly into the feverishly imagined state of national
emergency and accepting too easily the claims of necessity and the exigencies of national
security.110 The Hobbesian moment, when order must be beaten out of chaos, must be
confronted, if at all, only as necessity as fact, not as a rolling justification for executive
supremacy.

VI: Conclusion
I have argued that the attempt to justify both torture and extra-legal authority by
reference to necessity fails. It rests upon a conflation of necessity as fact with necessity
as justification and on a broad and deep misunderstanding of the nature of preinstitutional rights.
There may be no cliché more tired in the current debates over the limits of
national security than the line that “the Constitution is not a suicide pact,” as though
anyone had ever thought it was. As dictum, it serves entirely as rhetoric rather than
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justification for the issue under dispute. Justice Goldberg, in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez,111 uses it in reference to Congress’ draft powers in general, only to uphold the
appellees’ demand for due process before they could be stripped of their citizenship.
Justice Goldberg uses the phrase again in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,112 only to
disavow drawing any justification for restricting the travel rights of Communists. The
statement had, admittedly, more force in its original utterance, by Justice Jackson,
arguing in dissent for upholding the breach-of-peace conviction of a crypto-fascist
speaker stirring up an angry mob in the immediate shadow of World War II.113 But even
in that case, suicide was hardly what the more expansive speech protection upheld by the
majority entailed. “Suicide,” like necessity, makes for cheap rhetoric – and could have
made for worse law.
The bedrock principles we have, concerning the dignity of humanity and the
limits of legitimate power, are hard-won achievements of the last several centuries.
Scrabbled together out of convention, claimed in the shadow of authoritarian power, they
have become the marks by which we know our moral identities as both persons and
nations. Threats and emergencies demand response, but that response must be grounded
in a confidence in our principles’ ability to meet the demands of the world on our own
terms. This confidence is equally a form of judgment: the determination that threats to
our interests not be confused with threats to our existence. Far more dangerous to us, to
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who we are, is the threat of finding necessity in every conflict with evil and emergency in
every war.
At the level of philosophical reflection, the ticking bomb example does show
something: it shows that we can imagine limits to even our most deeply-held moral
principles. But we should use this realization to strengthen our principles and their
application in the world, not to abridge them. Here is how the realization of imagined
limits can strengthen principles such as the right against torture. By their very divergence
from real situations (existential necessity can exist only in a hypothetical world),
imagined scenarios like the ticking bomb example can continually remind us that we
have not reached the imagined limits in reality, that we need to push our principles farther
and ever farther, that if we relinquish our deepest precepts in an ideal world of imagined
scenarios, there will surely be no hope for them in the real world we all inhabit.
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